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Introduction 
 
The party wall surveyor has been known to Londoners since 17241
 
. However it was not until 
the enactment of the Party Wall etc Act 1996 over 250 years later that this statutory role 
became incorporated into national legislation affecting the whole of England and Wales. 
This new legislation regulates a variety of construction operations, including work to party 
walls, where these are carried out in close proximity to neighbouring properties. The Act 
makes provision for the service of notices before such work is undertaken, and for the 
appointment of surveyors to settle any disputes that subsequently arise. 
 
The role of surveyors appointed in this context has been the subject of much debate since the 
Act was introduced2
 
. There is a general understanding that surveyors perform a statutory 
function rather than acting as agents for those who appoint them. There is however 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the precise nature of the surveyors' duties and over the 
related question of who these duties are owed to.   
The conventional view, which is supported by leading practitioners under the former London 
Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939, is that surveyors should act impartially in their 
dealings between the parties to a dispute. The lack of any clear authority for this view coupled 
with commercial pressures on surveyors to respond to the expectations of their appointing 
owners has ensured that, in practice, the situation has remained ambiguous. The extension of 
the surveyors' role to geographical locations with no established professional culture in this 
field has further eroded the emphasis given to impartiality. 
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This article examines the nature of the surveyors' role under the legislation. It explores its 
legal basis and attempts to explain the precise nature of the surveyors' duties. In particular the 
article seeks to clarify the question of whether surveyors are under a duty to represent the 
interests of those who appoint them or to act impartially towards each party to the dispute. 
 
The Tribunal of Surveyors 
 
Role of the Tribunal 
 
The words of the statute provide very little indication as to the precise nature of the surveyors' 
role. The Act makes provision for the appointment of a tribunal of surveyors (s.10(1)) to settle 
by award any matter which is in dispute between the parties which is also connected with 
work to which the Act relates (s. 10(10)).   
 
This tends to suggest a role for the tribunal similar to that of an arbitrator or independent 
expert whereby defined issues are put to it by the parties for determination on a quasi-judicial 
basis. The nature of the task actually performed by the surveyors is, in reality, very different 
from this and such an interpretation also fails to take account of the tribunal's significance 
within the overall scheme of the legislation. 
 
The purpose of the legislation is to facilitate construction operations in the vicinity of property 
boundaries. One way in which this is achieved is by granting rights to property owners to 
undertake work to land or structures on their neighbour's side of the boundary line. Under the 
Act owners are, for example, entitled to place projecting foundations on neighbouring land, to 
cut a flashing into a neighbour's building and to underpin their neighbour's side of a party 
wall. 
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The tribunal's role, and the nature of the disputes that it is empowered to settle, must be 
viewed in this context. In permitting work on a neighbour's land Parliament has taken the 
unusual step of authorising an interference with private property rights. Within the English 
legal tradition this can only be justified by the grant of some reciprocal safeguard for those 
whose rights are being affected. This safeguard takes the form of the appointment of the 
tribunal of surveyors to watch over the process of the offending works. 
 
Safeguarding the Adjoining Owner's Rights 
 
This interpretation of the tribunal's role has received judicial support in a number of reported 
decisions under the earlier London legislation. In Gyle-Thompson v Wall Street (Properties) 
Ltd 3
 
 Brightman J noted that: 
".....the Act.... give[s] a building owner a statutory right to interfere with the 
proprietary rights of the adjoining owner without his consent and despite his protests. 
The position of the adjoining owner, whose proprietary rights are being compulsorily 
affected, is intended to be safeguarded by the surveyors appointed pursuant to the 
procedure laid down by the Act." 
 
A more precise definition of the tribunal's obligations is provided by McCardie J in the earlier 
case of Selby v Whitbread & Co4
 
: 
".....the primary function of the [surveyors] is to safeguard the interests of the 
adjoining owner; although they must, of course, consider the rights and interests of 
the building owner and follow the provisions of the Act....." 
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Whilst the tribunal's function is therefore to provide the necessary legislative safeguard for the 
adjoining owner its duties extend to both parties within the context of the regime laid down by 
the Act. 
 
An essential feature of this regime is that a building owner has an absolute right to undertake 
the work referred to in the legislation. Although the exercise of this right will invariably result 
in some inconvenience to adjoining owners the Act makes 'unnecessary inconvenience' 
unlawful (s.7(1)). The tribunal's task is therefore to balance the building owner's absolute 
right to undertake the work against the adjoining owner's absolute right not to be subjected to 
unnecessary inconvenience.  
 
The nature of this task was summarised by Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in Adams v 
Marylebone Borough Council5
 
: 
"In my opinion.....[the Act].....provide[s] the practical machinery for working out the 
policy of the Legislature with regard to the rights given to adjoining owners by the 
Act. It provides .......for the work being carried out in such a manner and at such a 
time as not to cause unnecessary inconvenience to the adjoining owner or, in other 
words, that the building owner shall use his rights reasonably so as not to cause 
unnecessary damage to the adjoining owner. That provision clearly opens up the 
question as to what is unnecessary inconvenience in each particular case, and the 
Legislature has constituted a practical tribunal for deciding such questions." 
 
The Practical Tribunal 
 
Whilst the tribunal is charged with the task of balancing the competing rights of the parties, it 
is therefore the practical consequences of these rights that concern the surveyors rather than 
abstract legal concepts.  
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According to Brightman J in Gyle Thompson6
 
, the tribunal's power under section10(12)(a) to 
determine "the right to execute any work" is not therefore to be taken literally. In accordance 
with the tribunal's practical role the power is limited to the task of determining the existence 
of a factual situation capable of providing the required precondition for the exercise of one of 
the statutory rights. Apart from this the trinunal's award will be concerned overwhelmingly 
with regulating the practical aspects of "the time and manner of executing the work" and with 
other matters "arising out of or incidental to the dispute" in accordance with sections 
10(12)(b) and (c). 
In view of this practical function in regulating construction operations for the mutual benefit 
of the parties, references in the legislation to the surveyors "resolving disputes" can be 
misleading. The reality is that, in most cases, the "dispute" which forms the basis of the 
tribunal's jurisdiction is simply a statutory construct which arises automatically from one 
party's failure to provide a formal written consent to a statutory notice within a fourteen day 
period (ss. 5 & 6(7)). Although this "deemed dispute" certainly reflects the absence of a 
written agreement between the parties it has little in common with the more usual 
understanding of the term where the parties have already adopted defined, and opposing 
positions on a particular issue.  
 
Indeed, once the tribunal's jurisdiction has arisen it is empowered to resolve the various issues 
that may arise throughout the continuance of the works without the requirement that further 
"disputes" should arise between the parties. Referring to this ongoing aspect of the surveyors' 
jurisdiction in Selby v Whitbread & Co7
 
 McCardie J noted: 
"Their jurisdiction is, I think, continuous and exclusive....It remains unimpaired until 
the final adjustment of all questions in difference between the building owners who 
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gave the notice and the adjoining owner who received the notice, and until the 
operations involved in the notice are concluded." 
 
Duties Owed by the Tribunal 
 
Nature of the Duties 
 
The tribunal's primary role is therefore to regulate the conduct of the works throughout the 
construction project in such a way that the parties' conflicting rights under the legislation are 
equitably balanced. The successful performance of this role requires the tribunal to diligently 
apply its specialist construction knowledge to the circumstances before it and to do so even-
handedly between the parties. It is submitted therefore that the three principal duties of the 
tribunal can be described in terms of those identified by Mustill & Boyd8
 
 as being owed by an 
arbitral tribunal, namely, to take care, to proceed diligently and to act impartially. 
These similarities between the two tribunals suggest that comparisons with the law of 
arbitration may assist in clarifying the nature of the surveyors' duties. Nevertheless, the lack 
of a single defined dispute for the surveyors to resolve and the clear requirement that they 
apply their own expert knowledge rather than performing a judicial function convince most 
commentators9 that they are not strictly arbitrators. Indeed, in Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapy v Simmonds Church Smiles10
 
 Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC expressed the view 
that: 
"An award under the Act is, in my judgement, sui generis and is more in the nature of 
an expert determination." 
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Whilst it is probably unwise to conclude that the tribunal is necessarily performing the role of 
independent expert any more than it is acting as an arbitrator, the law relating to expert 
determination may also prove useful in helping to define the surveyors' duties in this context. 
 
Returning to the three principal duties, the precise legal status of these duties is difficult to 
state with certainty and each will therefore now be examined in more detail. 
 
Duties of Care and Diligence 
 
The members of the tribunal clearly have a moral duty to take care and to proceed diligently 
with their task but to have any legal significance this must, of course, be reflected in the 
contractual or tortious relationships between the parties. Within the context of the laws of 
arbitration and expert determination the most widely accepted analysis suggests that a 
trilateral contract exists between the tribunal and each of the disputing parties.11
 
 
 If this interpretation is correct then the surveyors will collectively owe these duties to each of 
the parties as contractual obligations, subject only to the question of their possible immunity 
from suit. Additionally, and again subject to the question of immunity, it is also likely that the 
surveyors owe a collective duty of care to the parties in tort under the principle established in 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners.12
 
 
If the surveyors act as arbitrators then, to the extent that they are not guilty of "bad faith", they 
will be immune from liability for a breach of any of these duties.13
 
  In the event, as seems 
most likely, that they act in some other capacity then an entitlement to immunity would 
traditionally have arisen if they could properly be described as "quasi-arbitrators".  
Despite various references to the surveyors in these terms14 the courts are unlikely to be 
sympathetic to this interpretation. Since the cases of Sutcliffe v Thakrah15 and Arenson v 
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Casson Beckman Rutley & Co16 they have shown a reluctance to extend immunity beyond 
those performing a strictly judicial function. The term "quasi-arbitrator" is now thought to be 
obsolete17
 
 and, deprived of any possibility of immunity,  the most likely interpretation is 
therefore that the surveyors are indeed collectively subject to legally enforceable duties of 
care and of diligence to each of the parties. 
On this basis a breach of these duties would, in appropriate circumstances, entitle the parties 
to claim damages against the surveyors. However, by analogy with the law relating to expert 
determination18
 
, it is unlikely that it would justify the courts in setting aside the tribunal's 
award. 
Duty of Impartiality 
 
The duty of impartiality is fundamental to the task which the statute has empowered the 
surveyors' tribunal to perform. Although the existence of this duty is not expressly stated 
within the legislation it is well established that such duties are owed by arbitrators19 and by 
independent experts.20 The nature of the tribunal's task is such that professional guidance to 
surveyors in this context invariably assumes the existence of such a duty.21
 
 
On the basis that the tribunal is not performing an arbitral function the duty of impartiality is 
probably not synonymous with the rules of natural justice and there will therefore be no 
requirement for the surveyors to allow each party to present its case to the tribunal. The duty 
probably extends simply to the requirement that the tribunal should avoid bias, favouritism or 
prejudice in respect of either the issues under consideration or between the appointing parties. 
 
Although most appointed surveyors will be subject to additional professional duties regarding 
independence and conflicts of interest a breach of the legal duty of impartiality probably 
requires proof of actual bias or a real danger of bias: R v Gough.22 
 8 
 
A lack of impartiality could then amount to a "serious irregularity" justifying the court in 
setting aside an arbitration award23 and an expert's determination can also be set aside on this 
basis.24
 
 By analogy the court is likely to take the same view of a surveyors' award which is 
similarly tainted.  
Liability for Lack of Impartiality 
 
In contrast to the position where duties of care and diligence are breached, it is unclear 
whether the members of the tribunal might also be liable in damages for breach of the duty of 
impartiality.  
 
Mustill & Boyd25
 
 suggest that an arbitrator will be liable in circumstances where his conduct 
includes an element of dishonesty or collusion with one of the parties to the dispute. They 
draw a distinction between these circumstances and those where the arbitrator has no ill intent 
in which case no liability would arise. 
Whilst this may provide a possible analogy for the position of the surveyors' tribunal the 
distinction may simply reflect the circumstances in which the arbitrator will be entitled to 
statutory immunity from suit rather than the nature of the liability per se. This suspicion is 
confirmed by Sutton et al26 who suggest that the arbitrator's statutory immunity will provide a 
complete defence for a claim for damages for lack of impartiality but only, in line with the 
statutory provision27
 
, "in the absence of some element of personal or deliberate misbehaviour 
as evidence of bad faith". 
If the partial arbitrator who acts in good faith is only excused from liability by virtue of his 
statutory immunity, those independent experts and others who lack this shield must 
presumably expect partial behaviour to lead to liability. Despite the lack of direct authority on 
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the issue Kendall28
 
 concludes that independent experts will be so liable and there seems no 
logical reason why the same conclusion should not also extend collectively to the appointed 
surveyors. 
The Solitary Surveyor 
 
Agreed Surveyor 
 
The development of the general legal principles so far discussed has been influenced by the 
tendency in England to appoint tribunals consisting of a single expert or arbitrator. In these 
circumstances the roles and duties of the tribunal are, of course, synonymous with those of the 
individual who has been appointed.  
 
In the present context the Party Wall etc Act 1996 makes provision for the appointment of an 
"agreed surveyor" by the parties who then becomes solely responsible for performing the 
tribunal's tasks under the legislation (s.10(1)(a)).  As the sole member of the tribunal the 
agreed surveyor will also become entirely responsible for discharging its duties of care, 
diligence and impartiality to each of the appointing parties. 
 
Third Surveyor 
 
As an alternative to appointing an agreed surveyor the Act provides that the parties may each 
appoint a surveyor and that the two appointed surveyors shall then each select a "third 
surveyor" (s.10(1)(b)). The tribunal would thus consist of three surveyors although in practice 
most cases are determined jointly by the two party-appointed surveyors without any 
intervention by the third surveyor. 
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The third surveyor may however be called upon at any time by either of the parties or their 
surveyors to assist in the determination. In exceptional circumstances he may join the tribunal 
as chairman and produce a majority award with one of the other surveyors (s.10(10)). More 
usually his role will be that of umpire and he will make the award himself in a situation where 
the two party-appointed surveyors have failed to agree (s.10(11)) 
 
Once called upon to intervene the role and duties of a third surveyor must arguably be the 
same as those of a third surveyor, notwithstanding the differing circumstances surrounding his 
appointment. His appointment displaces the rights of the party-appointed surveyors to make 
an agreed award and the tribunal's authority and responsibilities become vested solely in him. 
His task is then not simply to adjudicate on the issues in dispute between the surveyors but to 
"determine [all] the disputed matters" between the parties (s.10(11)). This role is closely 
related to that of an umpire in arbitration proceedings as described by Mustill & Boyd29
 
: 
"Once the arbitrators have disagreed, and the umpire has entered upon the reference, 
he becomes seized of all the disputes in the case, and must deal in his award with all 
of them, even though there were some on which the arbitrators did not disagree." 
 
In assuming responsibility for all the matters referred to the tribunal, he must, like the agreed 
surveyor, also become entirely responsible for discharging its three duties of care, diligence 
and impartiality. 
 
The Party-appointed Surveyor 
 
A Duty of Impartiality? 
 
The position of the party-appointed surveyor, where no reference has yet been made to the 
third surveyor, is not so easily resolved. It has been suggested that each surveyor owes an 
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individual duty of impartiality to each of the appointing parties and that this must take priority 
to the interests of their own appointing client.30
 
 
Although few surveyors would openly challenge this principle of impartiality, some may feel 
that it bears little relevance to the commercial realities of the professional role which they 
actually undertake.  Each party understandably expects their own appointed surveyor to 
represent their interests and this is generally reflected in the surveyors' approach to 
negotiations. This approach usually produces an acceptable compromise which will then be 
reflected in the tribunal's award. 
 
Although these procedures work well in practice the lack of impartiality by individual 
surveyors may nevertheless run contrary to the requirements of the legislation. Whilst the 
1996 Act contains no clear guidance on this issue there are parallels within the law of 
arbitration.  
 
London Arbitration 
 
Although tribunals of three arbitrators are quite common in other jurisdictions they are 
comparatively rare in England. They are however found in trade, insurance, shipping and 
commodity arbitrations within the City of London. This custom of "London arbitration" 
involves the appointment of an arbitrator by each of the parties to jointly determine the 
dispute or to refer the matter to an umpire in the event of disagreement. In producing their 
joint determination it has long been suggested that the party-appointed arbitrators should 
behave impartially rather than favouring the position of their appointing party. Writing in 
1849, Russell31
 
 argued that: 
"The arbitrators so selected [ie one by each side] are not to consider themselves the 
agents or advocates of the party who appoints them. When once nominated, they are 
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to perform the duty of deciding impartially between the parties, and they will be 
looked on as acting corruptly if they act as agents or take instructions from either 
side." 
 
Although this view reflects what Mustill & Boyd32
 
 refer to as "the orthodox law of 
arbitration" London arbitration is far from orthodox in its customary requirement that each 
party-appointed arbitrator performs a dual role of arbitrator/advocate. In conventional 
arbitration practice the role of the party-appointed arbitrators ends once the dispute is referred 
to the umpire. In a London arbitration their role changes at this point to that of advocate for 
their appointing party and they are then required to argue that party's case before the umpire.  
The dual nature of this role suggests that there may be some tension between the arbitrators' 
duties of impartiality and their obligations to appointing parties during the period preceding a 
reference to the umpire. Mustill & Boyd33
 
 describe the nature of the arbitrator's role at this 
stage in the following terms: 
"....each member of the tribunal addresses the other, discussing with his colleague the 
favourable aspects of his party's case. This involves no compromise of the arbitrator's 
impartiality, for he is not making a case, so much as testing and discussing it." 
 
This fine distinction between making a case and testing and discussing it may be more 
imagined than real. As with the party-appointed surveyor's position many arbitrator/advocates 
in practice perform a negotiating role with their opposite number on behalf of their appointing 
party. Mustill & Boyd34
 
 suggest that the reality of this situation may be gaining acceptance 
with the judiciary: 
"There are, however some indications in the reported cases that the Court may be 
prepared to tolerate a more far-reaching departure from orthodoxy. The arbitrator has 
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been described as a 'negotiating advocate', the inference being that it is his task to 
strive for the best compromise result for the party who appointed him. It is undeniable 
that many arbitrators do indeed act in this way." 
 
The Negotiating Advocate 
 
It is likely that this notion of the negotiating advocate may have been in the minds of the 
legislators when they created the role of party wall surveyor in its current form.  
 
Surveyors have traditionally undertaken negotiating roles on behalf of clients in property and 
construction contexts. The statutory role of party wall surveyor, which first appeared under 
the 1724 London legislation35
 
, originally involved no suggestion of impartiality. Surveyors 
were appointed by neighbouring owners and were required to represent their client's interests 
before the justices in the event of their failure to negotiate an agreement.  
The role did not take its current form until the Metropolitan Building Act 1855 which granted 
the surveyors award-making powers and also made provision for the appointment of a third 
surveyor. The local practice of London arbitration seems to have been commonplace by this 
stage36
 
 and would have provided a useful model for a statutory code based on the surveyor's 
traditional role. 
If, as seems likely, Parliament's intention was simply to incorporate the surveyor's traditional 
professional role into a statutory code then references to a duty of impartiality appear to be 
misplaced. The limits of the surveyor's obligations in this context must be limited to his 
general duty to maintain independence in exercising his professional judgement. 
 
This interpretation, based on the concept of the professional negotiating advocate, is certainly 
consistent with the experiences of most party wall surveyors. It was also clearly the view of 
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Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC in Chartered Society of Physiotherapy v Simmonds Church 
Smiles37
 
 when he observed that: 
"....a party-appointed surveyor while no doubt retaining his professional 
independence is not obliged to act without regard to the interests of the party who 
appointed him. In practice matters in difference are regularly resolved by agreement 
between the two party-appointed surveyors without the need for the intervention of 
the third surveyor." 
 
Other Duties 
 
The lack of a duty of impartiality by party-appointed surveyors would have implications for 
the nature of their other duties.  It would suggest that the surveyors' primary duties are owed 
to their appointing owners rather than to the parties equally. 
 
Their duty of care to their appointing owners would therefore be similar to the duties owed by 
surveyors to their clients in other areas of their practice. It is likely however that a lesser duty 
would also be owed to the other appointing owner in respect of the general conduct of the 
tribunal's work. 
 
This lesser duty of care would overlap with the duty of diligence in administering the 
provisions of the legislation which would be owed to both parties equally. A failure by 
surveyors to deal promptly with matters arising under the legislation, possibly even in 
response to express instructions from their appointing owner, would therefore result in a 
potential liability to the other appointing owner. 
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Conclusion 
 
The tribunal established by the Party Wall etc Act 1996 has been shown to differ from those 
undertaking arbitrations or expert determinations although there are parallels with each of 
them.  This "practical tribunal" is primarily responsible for safeguarding the interests of 
adjoining owners where a building owner undertakes work which has been sanctioned by the 
Act and which interferes with property rights. The tribunal must regulate the construction 
operations so that the building owner is able to carry out the work in such a way that 
unnecessary inconvenience is avoided. 
 
By analogy with the laws of arbitration and expert determination it is suggested that the 
tribunal owes duties of care and of diligence to the parties as well as being subject to an 
obligation to act impartially between them. Where an appointed surveyor acts in the capacity 
of agreed surveyor or third surveyor he will be responsible for discharging these duties in 
their entirety. 
 
In situations where party-appointed surveyors are appointed the tribunal itself will continue to 
owe these duties to the parties but the individual surveyors will perform a different function. 
Based on the concept of the negotiating advocate within London arbitrations it appears that 
the surveyors' statutory role requires them to negotiate an acceptable compromise on behalf of 
their appointing owners. This is then given statutory effect by being incorporated into the 
tribunal's award. 
 
Both parties are protected by being separately represented on the tribunal and by their 
ultimate entitlement to call upon the third surveyor to discharge the tribunal's functions. The 
surveyors remain subject to duties of care and diligence and these also ensure that the parties 
can rely on the effective operation of the tribunal's machinery for the purpose intended by the 
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statute. In this way the tribunal discharges its own statutory duty of impartiality without 
requiring the individual surveyors to compromise the interests of their own appointing parties.  
 
In conclusion, this analysis suggests that party-appointed surveyors are primarily responsible 
to their own appointing owners. Unlike the agreed surveyor and the third surveyor they do not 
therefore appear, as individuals, to be subject to an obligation to act impartially between the 
parties. 
 
                                                          
1   The role first appeared in one of the early London Building Acts in 1724:  An Act for the better 
regulating of Buildings, and to prevent Mischiefs that may happen by Fire within the weekly Bills of 
Mortality, and other Places therein mentioned  [10 Geo. I. c. 28] 
 
2  See, for example, the archives of the Party Wall Practitioners' Discussion Forum [online]. Available 
from http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/partywalls/files/archive.html [Accessed 4 Feb. 2000] 
 
3   [1974] 1 All ER 295 at 302 
 
4   [1917] 1 KB 736 at 744  
 
5   [1907] 2 KB 822 at 840 
  
6   [1974] 1 All ER 295 at 302 
 
7   [1917] 1 KB 736 at 742 
 
8   Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C., Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, Butterworths 
1989, p. 224 
 
9   See, for example, Bickford-Smith, S & Sydenham, C., Party Walls: The New Law, Jordans 1997, p.    
51 and Jones, D., 'The Surveyor: Agent, Agitator or Arbitrator?' in The Collected Papers of the 
Pyramus & Thisbe Club, Volume 1 - 1974 - 1989,  p. 9 
 
10   [1995] 1 EGLR 155 
 
11   Murdoch, J. & Murrells, P., Law of Surveys and Valuations, Estates Gazette, 1995, p. 14 
 
12  [1963] 2 All ER 575 
 
13  Arbitration Act 1996, s.29(1) 
  
14  The Earl of Lytton, who sponsored the Party Wall Bill in the House of Lords, described the role of 
surveyors as "quasi-arbitral" during its Second Reading, Hansard, HL Debates, 31 January 1996, p. 
1535. See also the professional guidance produced by the RICS and the RIBA which both refer to the 
surveyor as a "quasi-arbitrator":  RICS, Party Wall Legislation and Procedure: A Guidance Note, RICS 
1996, p. 9 and Cox, S. & Hamilton, A., Architect's Guide to Job Administration: The Party Wall etc 
Act 1996, RIBA Publications 1997, p.17 
 
15   [1974] AC 727 
 
16  [1977] AC 405 
 17 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
17  Kendall, J., Expert Determination, FT Law & Tax 1996, p. 179 
 
18  ibid, p. 147 
 
19  Arbitration Act 1996, s. 33(1)(a) 
 
20  Kendall, J., op cit, p. 194 
 
21  See, for example, RICS, op cit, p. 11 and Pyramus & Thisbe Club, Code of Protocol, [online]. 
Available from: http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/partywalls/files/protocol.doc [Accessed 4 Feb. 2000] 
 
22  [1993] AC 646 
 
23  Arbitration Act 1996, s. 68(2)(a) 
 
24  Kendall, J.,  op cit, p. 148 
 
25   Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C., op cit, p. 232 
 
26    Sutton, D. St. J., Kendall, J. & Gill, J., Russell on Arbitration, Twenty First Edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell 1997, p. 170 
 
27  Arbitration Act 1996, s. 29(1) 
 
28  Kendall, J., op cit, p. 194 
 
29  Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C., op cit, p. 262 
 
30  Anstey, J., Party walls and what to do with them, RICS Books 1996, p. 15. See also Anstey, J., 
Trouble with the Neighbours, College of Estate Management 1983, p. 21 
 
31  Russell, F., On the Law of Arbitration, 1849, p. 206 - 7, quoted in Sutton, D. et al, op cit, p. 164 
 
32 Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C., op cit, p. 258 
 
33  ibid, p. 258 
 
34  ibid, p. 261 
 
35  See note 1 above 
 
36  See, for example, Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C., op cit, p. 257 and Kendall, J., op cit, p. 100 
 
37  [1995] 1 EGLR 155 
 
